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Abstract
The paper discusses democratisation practiced in Surakarta, 
Indonesia, which has been claimed by many experts as a 
municipality with “best practices” of democratic local governance 
in Indonesia. Their analyses focus on the actors and claim that 
participation is a possible way of crafting stable democracy. This 
participation in turn, they suggest, is a result of decentralisation 
which thus strengthen local democracy. Presenting the civil society 
participation and the decentralisation in the city of Surakarta, 
this paper shows that what actually happens is otherwise. It argues 
that the rise of popular participation was rooted in contentious 
local politics. Besides, the constitution of the new forms of popular 
representation are not supported by, and produced within, a clear 
ideological framework from the people in Surakarta.
Introduction
Participation through civil society and decentralisation 
has become the main theme within the current debates about 
democratisation.1 The assumption is that participation and 
decentralisation will strengthen democracy. The best Indonesian 
case in favour of these theses must be Surakarta municipality, 
1 We would like to thank Lukman-nul Hakim for his valuable contribution in 
both the discussion and editing, and HendraTry Ardiantoand BelaNagariin 
providing data. 
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34 also known as the city of Solo. Solo has become well known in 
the Indonesian debate because of its recent positive experience of 
popular participation. They include efforts at participatory budgeting 
and planning, in cooperation between political executives, various 
CSOs and social movements. Many development agencies and 
pundits refer to Surakarta’s experiencesin terms of “best practices” 
of democratic local governance in Indonesia. Theiranalyses focus on 
the actors andclaim that participation is a possible way of crafting 
stable democracy. This participation in turn, they suggest,is a result 
of decentralisation which thus strengthens local democracy.
But on a closer examination, dothe developments in Solo really 
support the optimistic theses? Fourseparated critical argumentsthat 
are generally overlapping suggest otherwise. One argument points 
to weaknesses in the participatory approach. Another claims that 
decentralisation has mainly come with elite-capture. Yet another 
emphasises the problems of popular representation. Thefourth 
acknowledges that while local strongmenmay need to go beyond 
clientelism to win elections, which may open up for popular 
participation, butthere are many inbuilt contradictions. Before we 
proceed by discussing the case of Solo, let us present these critical 
perspectivesin somewhat more detail.
Participation-Democracy Nexus: A Missing Link
Within the debate on decentralisation and development in 
bringing about local democratic governance, participation has been 
widely advocated as a main way to compel government to be more 
responsive and transparent (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003, pp.4-8). It is 
worthy noticing that decentralisation phenomena across the world 
are impossibly separated with the changing orientations of global 
development agencies (Hadiz, 2010)(Hadiz 2010; Harris et al., 
2004). Dominant perspectives, mainly propagated by the World 
Bank, have changed global development trajectories from reducing 
state’s roles into enabling state capacities and improving its legitimacy 
through encouraging greater public participation in decentralised 
governance. 
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In order to craft democracy, the World Bank emphasises people 
participation as a fundamental requirement. The Bank conceives 
participation as aggregated interests which are seen as being articulated 
by and through NGOs and local associations. Furthermore, it is 
also perceived that differences between various groups of societies 
in articulating their interests rest with ‘differing endowments of 
social capital, informal rules, norms and long-term relationships 
that facilitate coordinated action’ (World Bank 1997: 114). Inspired 
mainly by Robert Putnam (1993), the Bank subsequently defines 
social capital as “the norms and social relations embedded in the 
social structures of societies that enable people to coordinate action 
to achieve desired goals” (cited via Harriss 2002: 84).
The concepts of participation, civil society, and social capital in 
the current development and decentralisation discourse have become 
highly blurred and overlapping. As Ben Fine (2001) reminds us, 
the World Bank’s version of social capital appears to conceptually 
undermine the importance of social conflict and the dynamics of 
unequal power relations in determining development trajectories. 
In this version, concepts of participation and civil society—which 
rather constitutes an arena of struggle between competing interests—
thus become theoretically sterilised and apolitical (Hadiz 2010: 31). 
Social capital in its present manifestations, therefore, has become a 
fundamental element of the wider technocratic project to depoliticise 
development and democracy. Social capital is merely, to quote John 
Harriss “a weapon in the armoury of the anti-politics machine” as it 
is not a civic notion to politically empower society but to make them 
technocratically manageable (Harriss 2002: 13; Harriss etal 2004; 
Ferguson 1994). This idea, therefore, holds out the prospect of the 
introduction to certain institutions that may foster democracywithout 
permitting political competition or conflict between different social 
groups and classes, and it turnsmany institutions into formalities. 
Elitist decentralisation
Decentralisation is also not a panacea. After a decade of 
comprehensive and radical decentralisation in Indonesia, there are 
still severe problems in participation and democracy. The paradoxes 
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36 of participation-democracy relations between neo-liberal and pro-
democracy versions in decentralised governance are well represented. 
The implementation of decentralisation framework in 1999, after 
the 32 years of centralistic and authoritarian Suharto regime, 
was widely welcomed by both “neoliberal technocrats” and pro-
democratic movements as an essential way to build democracy. There 
were common expectations and beliefs at that time, introducing 
such institutional frameworks would bring about local democratic 
and effective governance. Contemporary studies on Indonesian 
local politics, however, are characterised by general conviction that 
applying democratic institutions do not automatically bring about 
democratic polity (e.g. Nordholt and van Klinken 2007). There is an 
increasingly common call instead for theclose examination of power 
relations in participation and democracy for the specific context. 
Robison and Hadiz’sReorganising Power in Indonesia (2004), 
for instance, convincingly demonstrates that democratic institutions 
in the post-Suharto era are hijacked by the old oligarchic business 
and political power which are able to successfully accommodate 
themselves in the new system. The paradox of democracy and 
democratisation, according to Robison and Hadiz, is not stemming 
from institutional formats but from the complexities of social conflict 
which old business and political elites involve in preserving their 
interests and power. They paradigmatically challenge actors based 
approach in democratisation studies, as prominently propagated 
by transitologist and good governance perspectives, which highly 
emphasis on institutional changes through elite pact and technocratic 
crafting. They also argue that such approach has severely neglected 
analysis on techniques, procedures, and power relations mechanisms 
in political economic institutions in which power actually operates. 
Nordholt’s Decentralisation in Indonesia: Less State, More 
Democracy? (2004) investigates the current relations of politics and 
democracy in Indonesia through post-colonial lenses. He argues 
that the current local political elites are products of prolonged 
power configuration between bureaucracy and local aristocrats since 
colonial period (politics of indirect rule). These local aristocrats 
were soon absorbed into local and national bureaucracy after the 
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Indonesian Independence. The implementation of decentralisation 
has, again, significantly increased local aristocrats’ roles in the local 
levels. Through the term ‘changing continuities’, Nordholt asserts 
that decentralisation and democratisation have not significantly 
transformed the old patrimonial characters of Indonesian politics 
(see also Nordholt and van Klinken 2007; Dwipayana 2004).       
Furthermore, wide democracy assessments ‘from below’ 
conducted by the research oriented NGO Demos in cooperation 
with the University of Oslo (Piryono, et al. 2007 and Samadhi and 
Warouw 2009)  succinctly conclude that democratisation in this 
country is actually facing a crisis; that democratic institutions have 
been taken over by elites for their own interests.
Problems of popular representation
Why has this occurred? In comparative perspective, the 
contributors to Harris et al.(2004) and Törnquist, et al. (2010) 
have concluded that the prominent problem of new local politics 
is that the development of democracy has been depoliticised. The 
core problem of this ‘democratic deficit’, according to Törnquist and 
others, is not that there are imperfections with regard to
…the new and positive civil and political freedoms, but rather that 
the defunct instruments and popular capacities to exercise control 
over public matters have made it difficult to use the freedoms and 
new institutions to alter the relations of power and thus improve 
law, policies and governance (Törnquist, etal. 2010: 5).  
In order to deal with current problems of democracy, this argument 
suggests that the influence of popularity to alter the structure of power 
and to open up for political transformation is most essential. It inevitably 
calls for the analysis on politics of representation. It is in this new 
conceptual framework that the actual relations between participation 
and democracy can be problematised in a more fruitful way. The ultimate 
task for improved democratisation is, therefore, to bring the political 
dimension back into the participation-democracy nexus.  
Within a similar context, Avritzer’s account on contemporary 
democratisation in Latin American countries is highly important to 
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38 be addressed. In Democracy and Public Space in Latin America (2002), 
he notes, in the same vein as Harriss et al. (2004) and Törnquist 
et al. (2009), that transition theory of democratisation—that has 
been particularly well developed in regard to Latin America through 
the works of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter,for 
instance—has over-emphasised on the roles of political elites and 
thus neglected the significance of recent popular political movements. 
Transition theories recognise the possibility of undemocratic and 
pro-democratic mobilisation and collective action, but limit the role 
of mobilised masses to the negotiation with elites. 
Through illustrative case studies on Brazil, Argentina and 
Mexico, Avritzer demonstrates that democratic collective action 
within these respective countries has opened a space for political 
participation and challenged ‘traditional (hierarchical and clientelist) 
understanding of politics’ (2002: 3), and that there are institutional 
designs—as in the case of participatory budgeting—whereby such 
democratic participation may be linked into political system. By 
‘participatory publics’ concept, he normatively noticed that:
... democratization is the result of transformation at the public 
level and that full democratization is the capacity to transform 
new practices from a societal innovation into a public form of 
decision making (Avritzer, 2002, p.5)
Avritzer’s main contribution is that he has opened up the 
possibilities to understand democratisation beyond competition 
between elites. He also emphasises on the importance of political 
linkage between the emergence of democratic institutions in 
which citizens can equally participate in determining development 
orientations (Avritzer 2002: 35). It is true that Avritzer’s idea about 
participatory publics is highly normative. The prospect for this 
participatory model for building democracy, therefore, should be 
assessed through cautious analysis of the politics of local sphere. 
Post clientelism
Politics towards the kind of practices of fostering popular 
representationvisualised by Avritzer have been most promising in 
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the framework of participatory planning and budgeting in Brazil 
(e.g. Baiocchi 2003 and Baiocchi and Braathen this volume) and the 
Indian state of Kerala (e.g. Tharakan 2004). Meanwhile appreciative 
scholars like James Manor (2010 and this volume), however, argue 
that such achievements call for extensive political facilitation; in 
Brazil by the new Labour Party (PT) and in Kerala by a popular 
education movement in combination with leading segments of a Left 
Front Government. The problem, according to Manor, is that such 
political support is quite unrealistic in most parts of the global South. 
Instead, Manor points to a less ideal yet existing possibility for 
civic action to make a difference in context that leading politicians 
and parties no longer can win elections only by means of patronage 
politics. In the context of what he therefore labels ‘post-clientelism’, 
politicians also have to attract voters from wider sections of the 
population, including by populist measures. Hence,some politicians 
opt for cooperation with well reputed leaders and organisations in 
civil society too; to gain additional votes from enlightened middle 
classes and the vulnerable people that are supported by the CSOs.
The dynamics of post clientelism is quite volatile, Manor adds. But, 
is this a better way of understanding the developments in Solo?It 
anywayremains to be analysed: what problems and options for local 
democracy that could develop under such conditions?
The enquiry 
What perspective is most fruitful, then, in understanding the 
developments in Solo? Two processes seem to be critical to examine 
irrespective of perspective. Firstly, it’s about the dynamics of 
linkagesbetweenpolitical commitment of local government to people 
participationon the one handand the civic engagement on the other 
hand. Secondly,the extent to which the thus generated participation 
in local governance can transform, potentially, the existing fledgling 
democratic institutions—and thus effectively bring about a further 
developed democratic polity in Surakarta? 
The next major sectioninvestigates, thus, the making of public 
participation in Surakarta. One result, which tends to be neglected 
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40 by all the previously cited arguments, is the importance of the 
historical roots of popular mobilisation in the area. In the third 
main section we present therefore also a prolonged history of the 
organised civic engagement that has constituted Surakarta as one of 
the main sites of resistance in Indonesia since 18th century. Finally, 
against this backdrop, we shall provide a critical analysis on problems 
and potentials for transforming Surakarta’s current politics to build 
democratic polity. 
Politicising Representation: A Blessing in Disguise?
The general Indonesian elections in 1999, with 48 political 
party contestants, has apparently changed political configuration 
and thus become a turning point for current political structure in 
Surakarta municipality. It was the first democratic election that was 
held soon after the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998. 
During the Suharto periods, as in many other areas in Indonesia, 
political configuration of parliament and executive bodies in 
Surakarta was continuously dominated by military figures and those 
from Golkar—the government party. The Indonesian Democratic 
Party for Struggle (PDIP) led by Megawati—a daughter of the first 
Indonesian President, Sukarno, and a symbol of resistance during the 
authoritarian rule—got landslide victory in the election with 56,7% 
votes and also won in all sub-district levels in Surakarta municipality. 
The PDIP effectively controlled 24 out of 45 numbers of seats in the 
local parliament (53%). There were almost no significant competitors 
for the PDIP in the parliament as other parties got only small number 
of seats. Even the Suharto’s old Golkar Party and the Muslim based 
United Development Party (PPP), which were previously dominant 
in Surakarta, only gained two and one seat respectively (Lay 2000: 
99-103).2
2 Political configuration in Surakarta after the 1999 general election is presented 
as the following. The Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP) gained 
landslide victory with 56.7% votes and 23 numbers of seats in the parliament. 
The second winner went to National Mandate Party (PAN), an Islamist-
Nationalist party, with 13.89% votes and 6 seats in the parliament. The old 
government party-Golkar and Muslim-based party, PPP (United Development 
Party), which were previously dominant in Surakarta, only gained 13,89% 
(2 seats) and 3.99% (1 seats) respectively. More interestingly, the Indonesian 
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However, rivalries among PDIP cadres came about when the 
local parliament elected the mayor and its deputy after the 1999 
election. At that time, the head of local governments in Indonesia 
were still elected by the representatives of the local parliament, 
whereas direct election for head of local governments were 
subsequently implemented in 2004 after the amendment of the Local 
Government Act No. 22/1999.3 Although the mayor candidate, 
SlametSuryanto, had huge support from ordinary people and PDIP 
cadres in Surakarta, his support in the parliament was extremely low. 
He was only supported by 9 out of 23 (23%) PDIP delegates in the 
local parliament (Lay 2000: 103). The major votes of the PDIP went 
to Suryanto’s rival, Suhendro. 
Disappointed by his own party and most of its representatives 
in the local parliament, Suryanto’s group then built new political 
support by approaching J. Soeprapto of the then fraction of five 
members in local parliament which represented the military and 
police. Thus, SlametSuryanto-J.Soeprapto were subsequently elected 
as mayor and deputy of Surakarta municipality without political 
support from Suryanto’s original party, the PDIP. 
It paved the way for continuous conflicts between the political 
executive and legislative bodies in Surakarta. SlametSuryanto is a 
typical example of the kind of leader which in Indonesia used to 
be labelled solidarity maker, that is, he is very good at mobilising 
popular support, often by way of populist views and measures. On 
the other hand he had no adequate experience in administration 
and in governing public institutions. He, thus, relies heavily on the 
municipal secretary and on bureaucrats in conducting his duties. As 
a consequence, the conflicts are not merely between the parliament 
and Suryanto itself, but also between the parliament and Surakarta’s 
bureaucracy. Furthermore, the conflicts were not only through day-
to-day controversial statements over certain issues, but also in formal 
Christian Party (KRISNA) got 1.07% votes, but had no representative in the 
parliament (Lay 2010). 
3 The direct local election was mandated by the Local Government Act Num. 
32/2004 which replaced the previous decentralisation act. There are several 
major changes in this new framework, including the implementation of direct 
local election for head of both district and provincial governments.
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42 political processes. Many government initiatives were gaining less 
support—and even resistance—in the parliament. It culminated 
when all political party fractions in the parliament rejected the 
mayor’s Accountability Report in April 2001.4
In order to challenge the political pressures from the 
parliament, the local government, then, turned to encourage public 
participation. The Local Development Planning Body (Bappeda) is 
unit in local government administration that was often pressured by 
the parliament due to its main role in local development planning. 
Technocratic arguments of Bappeda, even if very good, often failed to 
gain political legitimacy by way of support from the members of the 
local parliament. The parliament members consider that they are more 
legitimate as they represent people through electoral representation, 
while the bureaucracy does not. From the point of view of those 
who appreciated the proposals from within the administration 
and wanted to relate to them, it called for new kind of people 
representation that could challenge the legitimacy of the parliament. 
Therefore, participatoryplanning and budgeting advocated by the 
Bappedabecome an essential way for social movement and civil 
society activists and their partners within politics of politicising and 
expanding popular representation. 
Outside public governance and as part of massive NGO 
programs on strengthening civil society in the post-Suharto era, civic 
engagement in Surakarta was also widely organised (Rivai et al., 2009). 
By contrast to most other cities and districts, there were effective inter-
groups forums in Surakarta, namely the Study Forum for Democracy 
and Social Justice (Forum StudiDemokrasidanKeadilanSosial, FSDKS) 
and a NGO Forum facilitated by the Institute for Rural Technology 
4  Due to this rejection, the mayor had to revise and read the second report before 
the parliament. In order to pave the way for the second chance, the mayor had 
to “accommodate” parliament interests. For instance, he gave the concession 
to increase the local budget for parliament members’ wage. Furthermore, the 
mayor had to discipline his government officials who are complained by the 
political fractions as being suspected for corruption in several projects. The 
mayor’s efforts were successful and the second Accountability Report that he 
read before the parliament’s plenary meeting in 23 May 2001 was subsequently 
accepted through voting with 28 votes. See Radar Solo, 6 April 2001 and Radar 
Solo, 24 Mei 2002.    
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Development (LembagaPengembanganTeknologiPedesaan, LPTP). 
These forums became embryos for further participatory initiatives in 
decentralisation era. In January 2001, they set up a joint actionso-
calledSynergy Forumwhich involved more stakeholders, including 
NGOs, academics, bureaucrats, local association, to address local 
autonomy issues (Pratikno 2005). This Forum had facilitated the 
birth of Local Regulation on the Institute for Villages’ Community 
Empowerment (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kelurahan, 
LPMK), a regulatory framework for participatory planning and 
budgeting in village levels in Surakarta municipality.  
Some external interventions are also worth noticing with regard 
to the strengthening of participatory planning initiatives. In the 2000s, 
the Ford Foundation supported three NGOs, namely Gita Pertiwi, 
Leskap, and Inres, to establish the Consortium for Monitoring Public 
Institution Empowerment (Konsorsium Monitoring dan Pemberdayaan 
Institusi Publik, KOMPIP), the aims of which were to develop and 
map local governance issues. It was a multi-stakeholders consortium 
that involved Bappeda, and representatives from the Solo university 
and NGOs.5 The Ford Foundation enabled the Consortium to make 
a comparative study on the government and society relations in local 
budgeting in the Philippines in the early 2000s. Such partnership 
was subsequently institutionalised through the establishment of IPGI 
Solo (Indonesian Partnership on Local Governance Initiative). IPG 
Solo was thereby part of a wider network including IPGI Bandung in 
West Java Province and IPGI Dumai in Riau province. IPGI’s main 
focus was to develop participatory planning mechanisms that were 
tested out in 2001 (Rivai et al. 2009: 37).
Another important intervention was the Breakthrough Urban 
Initiative Local Development (BUILD) Program, initiated by the 
UNDP and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Departemen Dalam 
Negeri, Depdagri) in the 2000s. The program mainly focused on 
improving public services and participation. It was through the 
BUILD Program that village-based facilitators benefited various 
5 This program involves Drs. Qomaruddin, MM (head of Surakarta’s Bappeda), 
Drs. Totok Sudarsito (Dean of Social and Political Faculty, State University of 
Solo),  and Agus Dodi Sugiarto of Gita Pertiwi.
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44 training on participatory budgeting (Histiralludin 2004). At that 
time, participatory budgeting was still conducted in spatial or 
territorial basis wherein villages became its main working units. 
In addition, as a part of the BUILD Project, UNDP subsequently 
introduced the City Development Strategy (CDS) program with the 
aim of strengthening the involvement of especially vulnerable groups 
in urban sectors targeted for reforming participatory planning and 
budgeting, which otherwise was based on territorial communities. 
These so-called sectoral groups thus included urban street vendors, 
rickshaw driver, traditional market, hawkers, buskers as well as sex 
workers. Interestingly, this initiative was welcomed and supported by 
the local government through Mayor Suryanto’ Decree No.410/45-
A/I/2002 on Involving Sectoral Groups issued in 2002. In practice, 
the participation of sectoral groups was mainly facilitated by the 
Working Team of City Development Strategy which then focused 
on three issues: social conflict, urban management, and marginalised 
society (Rivai et al., 2009: 37-40). 
The local government subsequently tried to encourage sectoral 
groups’ participation in the existing territorial-based development 
planning that hierarchically started from Muskelbang (villages-level 
development forum), Muscambang (sub-district-level forum) and 
Muskotbang (Municipal-level forum) through theMayor Decree 
No.8/2003. It provedsimply impossible, however, to accommodate 
the rapidly expanding sectoral groups with their interests and 
demands in the territorial based development forum, particularly on 
the village level.
The most significant achievement was instead that the local 
government issued the Mayor Decree No.3/2004 on Technical 
Guidance for Participatory Development Planning that encouraged 
sectoral groups to hold Focus Group Discussions (FGD) in their own 
respective communities or groups. The FGD’s results, according to 
this Decree, would be possible to synchronise with related municipal 
departments without being channelled through territorial-based 
participatory planning forum. In other words, local government 
applied two models of participatory planning—territorial and sectoral 
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basis. 
Numerous sectoral groups’ FGDs were effectively facilitated 
by local NGOs under the coordination of the Bappeda. This model 
has massively increased participation level in Solo city of vulnerable 
people in sectors and areas subject to ‘urban development’ and reform. 
The Bappeda thenfollows up the FGDs results by organising Limited 
Group Discussions (Diskusi KelompokTerbatas, DKT) to synchronise 
various demands.6The DKT results become prominent input for 
related municipal departments in designing development programs. 
This sectoral based participatory planning was then integrated into 
the existing development planning forum in the municipality level.
It is obvious that political conflict between the executive 
government and the parliament forced Surakarta municipality 
government to seek wider support from society. In other words, 
political momentum for initiating participatory planning and 
budgeting in Surakarta is unable to be separated from the context 
of this antagonism. The commitment of local government to involve 
popular participation underwent in the advantageous situation 
for many local and international NGOs which actively supported 
various programs on public participation. 
Unlike the Kerala’s experience wherein Peoples’ Planning 
Campaign (Tharakan 2004: 108-109) is the results of the prolonged 
ideological struggle and gets the momentum—when the Left and 
Democratic Front (LDF) won the 1996 local election and was 
gaining power—the Surakarta’s popular participation is thusshort 
of ideological foundation and is less based on extensive popular 
organisations and also less institutionalised. 
Historical Roots of Popular Mobilisation 
Besides the political setting that forced government to involve 
people involvement in policy making, Surakarta has a long history of 
6 Many local NGOs actively facilitate sectoral groups’ FGDs as the following: 
small retailers groups are facilitated by Leskap, children workers are facilitated 
by Sari,pedi-cab drivers by SekolahWarga Mandiri, singing beggars are mediated 
by Inres, women groups by Spekham, while diffable communities are facilitated 
by Interaksi, Lampu andTalenta (see Rivai etal. 2009: 41).
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46 its organised popular mobilisation. Even if it has been undermined 
during Suharto’s authoritarian rule, it is still present in people’s minds 
and thus worthy of taking into account. 
As early as 18th century, Javanese kingdoms were characterised 
by endless elite conflicts resulted in their collapse and division 
into smaller kingdoms. Since the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie, the Dutch company in East India) period in 17th 
century, the Dutch often exploited such internal conflicts for their 
own interest through devide et impera policies. 
In 1743, King Pakubuwana II in Kartasura (immediately 
north-west of Solo) was supported by the Dutch to reign power 
after facing prolonged rebellious movements. The King soon moved 
the kingdom’s capital to Solo and immediately changed the name 
into Surakarta—a reversed version of the old kingdom’s capital. The 
King had to grant the whole Javanese coastal areas for VOC interests 
as a concession. Within this setting, the Kasunanan Kingdom of 
Surakarta was established and was also marked by the first infiltration 
of the Dutch colonial in the heart of Javanese power. Soon after the 
establishment of Kasunanan Kingdom, a contending kingdom was 
built in Yogyakarta through the Giyanti Peace Agreement in 1755 
and HamengkuBuwono I became the first King. Only two years 
later, another rival—the Mangkunegaran Kingdom—was set up 
in the Solo area after deadly rebellious movement led by Mas Said 
(Siraishi 1997: 1-3; Pemberton 2003: 55). 
The initial popular mobilisation in Surakarta, beyond the 
elite struggles, was massively organised against the Dutch imposed 
cultivation of cash crops, the Cultuurstelsel (Tanam Paksa), proposed 
by J. van den Bosch. This forced cultivation system was introduced 
to recover the Dutch’ economic bankruptcy after the Javanese 
War (1825-1830). This new system called for a new approach to 
governance. The Duth had to collaborate with local aristocrats 
who controlled lands for developing plantations. In this period, 
colonisation was conducted through indirect rule and local monarchy 
was still effectively governing their people. It was through this system 
that concepts of labour divisions, argiculture commercialisation, 
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and contracts system were subsequently introduced in Java. In the 
Javanese feudal system, local aristocrats occupied the whole lands 
and gave their rights for managing and processing their lands to bekel 
(superior tenants). It was through bekel that common people were 
working in farms and plantations with unfair earnings (Suhartono 
1991). The Cultuurstelsel system was thus effectively applied within 
the feudal system ruled by local leaders and kingdoms with exclusive 
support from the Dutch colonial. 
The Cultuurstelsel system made Surakarta’s people more 
marginalised and living in acute poverty as they often had to leave 
off their farms for working obligation in the Dutch’s plantations. 
This situation brought about peasant protests. Shiraisi (1997: 23-
25) identifies two types of people’s resistance in Surakarta. First, 
it is aboutthe individual and sporadic actions against plantation 
controllers for protecting people’s lands and personal revenge. In this 
periods, namely 1860-1870s, there were many kecu (thug) whom 
were hired to kill and torture European people in the plantations. 
In addition, people were also frequently burning plantation areas as 
a resistance to the system. Second, popular mobilisation was more 
organised in advocating their interests. They were often doing nggogol 
(mass demonstration) by marching to the local leader offices and even 
to the kingdom. If their protest were failed to be accommodated, 
they would commit to strike in both kingdom and plantations. The 
Cultuurstelsel systemhas inevitably brought about popular distrust 
in local government, thus making the state-society relations quite 
‘fragile’. Violent conflictswould easily take place whenever the 
government unable to negotiate with ‘its’ people.
The development of capitalism coupled with colonial political 
settings made Surakarta’s politics much more dynamic in the early 
20th century. Groups of Chinese business built a trading organisation, 
Kong Sing, aimed at expanding their economic interests in Surakarta 
and Java. The Islamic Trader Association (SDI)—which then became 
the influential political organisation Syarikat Islam (SI) that challenged 
the Dutch colonialism—was initially established to respond the 
domination of Chinese business in economic realm, particularly in 
batik (painted clothes) industries (Siraishi 1997: 55-65). 
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organisations in Surakarta. Their objectives were not onlylimited to 
economic interests, but also included political struggle against Dutch 
colonialism. The most radical were Indische Social-Democratische 
Vereeniging (ISDV, Social Democrat Association in Dutch India) 
and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), to mention some. 
These gained massive support in Surakarta. At this period, political 
organisations were deeply rooted in the sometimes overlapping 
ideologies of Islam, Nationalism, and Communism and Social-
democracy in particular. The organisations were competing to 
gain popular support. In 1918, however, the Leftist movements 
demonstrated their joint interests and radical characters by 
challengingthe feudal practices in the two Solo-based kingdoms, 
Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran. Furthermore, they destroyed 
plantations and other colonial assets (Larson 1990: 131). These 
groups had also mobilised labour and peasants to strike. In fact, they 
made Surakarta city the centre of a general strike in Central Java 
(Siraishi 1997). The political dynamics of these movements, within 
a general leftist-nationalist discourse, influenced Indonesian political 
struggles against colonialism in the 1920-1940s quite significantly. 
From 1960, the central government, led by the First President 
Sukarno, introduced a land reform policy that was essential in 
attempting to put an end to the feudal model and thus open up 
opportunity for common people to possess sufficient lands. It is 
obvious that this land reform policy was closely related to the Leftist 
ideology as Sukarno himself was also supported by the PKI, which 
had its main stronghold in the area around Solo and had become 
the world’s third largest communist party. This radical policy with 
populist president Sukarno in the forefront, however, suffered from 
conflicts among the poor as well as the resistance of local strongmen 
and could not be improved and completed ahead of the attempt 
by dissident officers and a few communist leaders to do away with 
rightist military leaders came about in 1965 and generated a full scale 
counter revolution. When General Suharto took over the power, he 
soon accused the PKI and its sympathisers of having staged a coup 
and banned PKI and its ideology in Indonesia. The banning of PKI 
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was immediately followed by massive killings particularly in Java and 
Bali, approximately 500.000-2.000.000 victims7, and it became one 
of the worst periods of Indonesian politics.     
Suharto immediately put an end to the reforms by removing 
land reform courts and issuing ‘floating mass’ policies—efforts to 
detach people from political activities (Fauzi 1999: 158-159). 
Suharto’s authoritarianism was not only built based on hisrepressive 
approach, but also included the elimination of any potentially 
contending ideology. Soon after the banning of PKI and Marxist-
Communist ideology, Suharto regime also forced mass organisations 
to only adopta single ideology, Pancasila. De-ideologisation and de-
politisation, therefore, became effective instruments for the regime 
to discipline people’s engagement in political issues.  
Surakarta became an important site of resistance, just as in 
the colonial periods. From 1987 till 1997, for instance, there were 
many popular protest cases against the government policies and 
government-supported business projects. For instance, massive 
protests rejected the establishment of Arum Manis restaurant (1987), 
Singosaren department store (1988), people demonstration against 
Sari Warna Asli textile industry (1992) and people rejection on the 
SDSB, a central government policy to pool ‘social’ funds through 
legal gambling. The protests culminated in 1995-1997, just before the 
1997 election, when government symbolicallypainted public space 
facilities with the yellow colour associated with Suharto’s Golkar’s 
party as a sign of dominance. It resulted in popular protests by way 
of re-painting those facilities with the white colour as a symbol of 
resistance (Budiman and Törnquist 2001). Massive demonstrations 
were significantly escalated and taken place in various cities which 
highly contributed to the fall of Suharto regime in 1998. The 
condition was worsening due to Asian economic crisis that brought 
about massive riots and violence against groups, mainly Chinese, who 
7 There are no precise data regarding the victims of PKI killings in 1965-1966. 
Robert Crib (1990), based on information from 39 reports and documents, 
mentioned that the victims range from 78,000 to 2,000,000 people. This 
destruction makes PKI, the third largest communist party in the world at that 
time, disappear from Indonesian history. 
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of the economy. Besides Jakarta, Surakarta was the most affected and 
destroyed city. 
Clearly, popular mobilisation in Surakarta has thus been quite 
dynamic throughout history. Such engagement, however, remain 
limited to resistance against power holders. With the exception of 
popular movements in the 1900-1960s, there are almost no organised 
and ideologically-guided movements in Surakarta which contribute 
to the construction of the contemporary face of popular mobilisation. 
The banning of communist—and generally the Marxist—influenced 
ideology and the effective de-ideologisation during Suharto regime 
have generated much of the fragmentation of the current social 
movements in Surakarta and Indonesia in general.  
Transformative Politics and the Challenge of Democratic Projects 
Decentralisation and democratisation which massively 
introduced in the post-Suharto era has changed current Surakarta’s 
social and political constellations. As we have already discussed, the 
strong commitment of Surakarta government to encourage people 
participation wasconstituted within the context of rivalries between 
the executive body led by the then Mayor Slamet Suryanto and 
local parliament. It is worthy noticing that although government 
affirmation to people participation was instrumental in order for the 
executives tochallengeelectoral legitimacy of parliament, it opened 
up a space for negotiation between state and society. 
It is only by analysing such antagonisms that one can understand 
the popular participation in Surakarta’s political context. The political 
rivalries made the local government executives politicising people 
representation beyond the electoral system. In other words, political 
antagonism facilitated the constructing of new forms of representation 
and enables semi-formalised negotiations between local government 
and Surakarta’s people. Dyrbergh (1997) emphasises that:    
Antagonism and context mutually constitute and subvert each 
other: it is the context that conditions and situates antagonism, 
but antagonism is also constitutive of context in the sense that 
it shapes, changes and undermines it (194-195). 
51
PCD Journal Vol. III No. 1-2 2011
Outside the framework of public governance, moreover, as 
we have demonstrated earlier, people participation in local politics 
has become much stronger and more organised, partly facilitated 
by NGOs’ programs of strengthening civil society (Suhirman 
2009; Handayani 2006a). In addition to the previously mentioned 
forums which primarily included NGOs, the Solidarity Forum for 
Peripheral People of Surakarta (Solidaritas Masyarakat Pinggiran 
Surakarta, SOMPIS), a dialogue forum consisting of various sectoral 
groups in the city, was established in the 2000s. SOMPIS aims at 
strengthening marginalisedurban societies’ rights and improving 
their bargaining positions in relation to local government. It is 
important to mention that the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and 
1998, which was particularly devastating in Indonesia, meant that 
the informal economic sectors increased as people simply had to find 
ways of surviving, primarily as pedagang kaki lima (small retailers), 
pengamen (singing beggars), pedi-cab drivers. To make some money 
theysquatted urban public spaces; and as a result they often faced 
government’s banning and disciplinary actions. The first SOMPIS 
convention, held in June 2001 and facilitated by KOMPIP Solo (the 
previously mentioned consortium to monitor the empowerment of 
public institutions), was attended by more than 56 representatives 
of 21 sectoral organisations in Surakarta municipality. It is through 
the SOMPIS that marginalised urban societies in Solo are no longer 
treated as ‘intruders’ or policy objects but influential stakeholders in 
policy making process. 
Such considerable changes in the societal level made the linkage 
between government and people more structured. Within this 
context, it is important to sketch the political constellations that 
enabled JokoWidodo and F.X. Hadi Rudyatmoto to take of as mayor 
and deputy mayors respectively in 2005. It is true that the Indonesian 
general election in 2004 did not bring significant changes for political 
constellation in the local parliament of Surakarta. PDIP remained 
the dominant party in the city. In 2005, however, Surakarta held the 
first direct local election (pilkada) of the local political executives, 
soon after the amendment of Local Government Act No.22/1999. In 
this direct election of mayor and vice mayor, the PDI Phad managed 
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won some 35% votes while their rivals supported by a new post-
Suharto Muslim party (PAN) got just below 30% of the votes and 
as didthe candidates backed by Suharto’s old party Golkar and the 
incoming Indonesian president’s Democrat Party. Surprisingly, the 
incumbent candidates, SlametSuryanto-HengkyNartoSabdo, who 
believed that they would gain massive support, only got just about 
5 % votes.Two important factors contribute to the failure of the 
incumbent candidates: as F.X. Rudy Hardyatmo became the new 
leader of PDIP Solo, SlametSuryantohas no longer had control over 
the most effective political machine in mobilising support that is party 
structure. It has been aggravated by his involvement in corruption. 
Once in office, JokoWidodo and F.X. Rudi Hardyat morealised 
that they had to somehow strengthen their position, only having 
been supported by about one third of the electorate. Their solution 
was to develop populist policies. Widodo is well acknowledged as 
a visionary person with business background while Hardyatmo is a 
charismatic figure of PDIP in Surakarta and has wide networks with 
ordinary people. Soon after elected as mayor, JokoWidodo applied 
the tourism-sense branding, Solo: The Spirit of Java, that effectively 
created as sense of ‘togetherness’ to thus expand their political basis.  
Furthermore, and this was the most important strategy, 
JokoWidodo successfully exploited the government-society linkages 
that had been structured in the previous period. The paradigmatic 
case, which are often cited and reported, is the peaceful and successful 
relocation of almost a thousand retailers of klithikan market (which 
literally means small but it presumably becomes illegal market as 
people mostly sell machines component without clear routes of 
where these goods come from) in the Struggle Monument’s city park. 
On the surface, many reports and studies put highly emphasis on 
the personal capacity of the new Mayor Joko Widodo and his Deputy 
F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo and thus construct them as populist leaders. If 
we look more detail at this process, however, we willfind that their 
success is highly determined by the existing Surakarta’s political and 
societal structure. When Joko Widodo sentenced the ultimatum to 
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retailers for having to leave off the city parkbefore 17th August 2006, 
on the Indonesia’s Independence day, retailers immediately posed a 
challenge through their resistance slogan: ngalah, ngalih, ngamuk, 
ngobong!, a warning of committing massive violence. Thus, there was 
no other option for the Mayor than torun aseries of negotiations and 
dialogues. It was certainly not an easy task since the Mayor had to 
manage negotiation rounds, through dinner meeting and hearings 
with the public, for approximately 54 times (Suara Merdeka, 14 June 
2009).8
In the whole negotiation process, the roles played by JokoWidodo 
in tandem with F.X. Rudy Hardyat mowere highly effective. 
Hardyatmo, a low-profile yet charismatic figure in PDIP, is widely 
known by ordinary people and is often conducting direct dialogue, 
accompanied by the PDIP Satgas. This special task force by the party 
may not necessarily be described as a gangster or militia group of 
which there were many in Indonesia at the time (and some are still 
there). But, when deemed necessary, it was able to command some 
coercive power.  Moreover, Hardyatmo was the head of Banjarsari 
sub-district, with the retailers in the klitikan city park market. 
Within the Javanese psyche, such intense and directdialogue is highly 
effective to persuade people as well as to socialise the government 
program. People called this as nguwongkewong,or humanising people, 
strategy. Meanwhile, JokoWidodo with his rhetoric ability constantly 
constructed the image of Solo as a comfortable and liveable city.
Comparing Solo to othercities and districts in the era of decentral-
isation, JokoWidodo’s populism in terms of strong direct links with 
the people and standing out as their ultimate representative is unique 
since he does not build it through pro-people policies related to health 
and education, which is otherwise most common, but the ability to 
negotiate with ordinary people thanks to the practices that had already 
been introduced. Soon after having concluded the negotiation, the 
8 This slogan approximately means “If we are defeated and moved away, we 
will commit to violence and burn (the city)”. He had to run negotiation 
series for seven months with high tension. It was after the 30th meeting, both 
government and retailers came to begin true dialogue wherein the government 
could effectively make presentation of their relocation plan. 
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carnival that gained massive media coverage. This carnival involved 
the traditional Royal army, artists and local associations, while—and 
this is the most important—the Mayor and its Deputy were riding 
horses in the front line to theatrically symbolise their popularity. 
Joko Widodo’s and Hardyatmo’spopularitywas once more 
proven by their landslide victory in the 2010 democratic local election 
wherein they won 90.06 % of the votes.9 There are, at least, two 
explanations forthis. First, JokoWidodo has become a centrum on 
which plurality of people demands are embodied, particularly due to 
his ability in managing such difference through constant negotiation 
and image building of togetherness. Second, the direct election 
system allows people to individually utilise their rights to vote their 
candidate. It is essential to be noted that people participation in the 
2010 local direct election (Pilkada) in Surakarta municipality was 
71.80%, the highest degree of participation in Indonesia (Kompas, 
21 Mei 2010). 
Various challenges may arise, however, in transforming this 
populism into more institutionalised democracy. The most critical 
challenge, as we outlined earlier, is to what extent that the dynamics 
of negotiation—which is still concentrated around JokoWidodo’s 
populism—can be transformed into certain formula that facilitates 
institutionalisation of diverse political interests without being 
channelled through a personal figure. Without transforming such 
forces into democratic institutionalisation, Surakarta’s populism will 
fall into new forms of bossism or local strongman. 
It must be noted, however, that while populism is highly 
vulnerable by undermining democratic polity, it is alsocrucial in 
improving democracy. Why? Several leading scholars of politics 
maintain as of recent that populism is not anevil by definition 
just because there were populist elements in for instance fascist 
regimes. Populism may also carry along a potential for building 
9 JokoWidodo and F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo were elected as the Mayor and its 
Deputy of Surakarta municipality for the second term in the 2010 direct local 
election. They gained landslide victory with 90.6% votes and won in the whole 
villages in Surakarta. See Solo Pos, 23 April 2010.
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stable democracy (Laclau 2005; Dyerberg 1997). The foundation of 
populism, like democracy, is the construction of the people (demos) 
through collective demands which in turn means the generation of 
a community that defines what should be meant by popular affairs. 
Or to quote Ernesto Laclau, it is ‘a plurality of demands which, 
through their equivalential articulation, constitute a broader social 
subjectivity’ (Laclau 2005: 74).Populism only comes about when 
such various demands are then unified and symbolically embodied 
in the personal figure. But, it may be democratised.Populism is 
contingently potential for democratic polity as it, as democracy 
does, requires politicising popular demands and participation. 
Without politicising popular demands, as we have argued earlier, 
the institutions that are supposed to foster democracy are merely 
an empty shell. Therefore, the challenge of democratic project is to 
transform this populism, this personal based embodiment of people 
articulation, into a more institutionalised framework of democratic 
representation.
Conclusion
Who is right and who is wrong about Solo? Is it a showcase of how 
decentralisation and participation can foster more democracy? Or is 
it flawed by problems of depoliticised and managerial civil society 
groups, local elitism, lack of representation and the ambiguities 
of ‘post-clientelism? We have argued that the picture is more 
complicated. Decentralisation provided a framework and donors like 
the UNDP and Ford Foundation as well as imaginative civil society 
activists were there. But, so were elitism and poor representation. 
In fact, the commitment of local government to initiate 
participatory planning and budgeting in Surakarta was due 
primarily to constant confrontation between the political executive 
(bureaucracy) and parliament soon after the first democratic election 
in the post-Suharto era in 1999. Unlike the dominant explanations 
which are highly normative and technocratic, we argue that the rise 
of popular participation was rooted in contentious local politics. 
Contending visions of representation forced local government to 
encourage people engagement to challenge the electoral legitimacy 
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Such conflicts within the elite and such attempts on part of the 
subordinated classes and groups to use the rivalries to make some 
advances were nothing new. There has been a long history of popular 
resistance in Solo since the 18th century. People may not know the 
technicalities of democracy, but they know what it means and what it 
takes. Such historical analysis is neglected by most perspectives in the 
debate. Such analysis reveals active yet fragmentary group of societies 
which have called for greater accommodation and negotiation both 
vertically—i.e. between state and society—and horisontally among 
fragmented groups of societies.
Furthermore, we have also argued that even if the second 
populist Mayor Joko and his deputy were less haunted by a conflict 
between the executive and the local parliament as his party PDIP 
had closed ranks. But they did not enjoy the support of a popular 
majority, and thus had to further develop his predecessor’s populist 
measures and mobilise the organisational clout of PDIPs not so 
democratic task force. These measures were in turn supplemented 
by various development agencies as well as by civil society activists. 
The Mayor and his deputy Hardyatmo even became favourites of 
the urban poor. And when their pacts translated into clean streets 
and less violence, the Mayor in particular turned a favourite of the 
middle classes, too. 
Nevertheless, although there are now comparatively strong links 
between local government and people through a system of informal 
though regular negotiations, these rest still with the popularity and 
the trust in Mayor Joko Widodo and his deputy. Frequent empirical 
evidences suggest that the attempts at politicising representation in 
Surakarta’s politics remain highly fragile. 
On the one hand, the constitution of the new forms of 
popular representationare not supported by, and produced within, 
a clear ideological framework. The linkages between government 
and people are rather, primarily, the result of instrumental politics 
on part of the dominant actors in the context of political conflict 
between executive and parliament bodies. It is true that this has at 
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times crated openings for social and political activists to develop 
transformative practices. However, on the other hand, again, the 
present structures for negotiation between state and people have not 
yet been institutionalised to survive ‘the good populist leader’and thus 
proceed beyond inconclusive post-clientelism. Such institutions can 
be created by design in seminars on paper, but they remain an empty 
shell until the issues and interests that are now being negotiated by 
a populist leader carried along in more democratic-representative 
and forceful forms within a strategic ideological and organisational 
framework.
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